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ABSTRACT
This paper presents arguments for, and evidence in support of, the important role of
pleasure in animals’ lives, and outlines its considerable significance to humankind’s
relationship to other animals. In the realms of animal sentience, almost all scholarly
discussion revolves around its negative aspects: pain, stress, distress, and suffering. By
contrast, the positive aspects of sentience – rewards and pleasures – have been rarely
broached by scientists. Yet, evolutionary principles predict that animals, like humans, are
motivated to seek rewards, and not merely to avoid pain and suffering. Natural selection
favours behaviours that enhance survival and procreation. In the conscious, sentient
animal, the drives to secure food, shelter, social contact, and mates are motivated by desire
(appetitive behaviour) and reinforced by pleasure (consummative behaviour). This is
reflected in animals’ behaviour in the realms of play, food, sex, and touch. Despite the
heuristic value of interpreting animal behaviour through the proximate (experiential) lens,
scholarly study of animals remains entrenched almost exclusively in the ultimate
(evolutionary) sphere. Not just science but also ethics suffer for this, for when we see
animals as only the products of a competitive struggle for survival, we risk overlooking the
positive qualities of their lives. Pleasure has moral import for such practices as factory
farming and laboratory research, for it amplifies the moral burden of depriving animals the
opportunity to lead fulfilling, enjoyable lives.
INTRODUCTION
At long last, sentience is gaining the importance it deserves in matters concerning humans’
relationship to other animals. For much of the 20th Century questions of animals’ so-called
‘‘private’’ experiences were dismissed as invalid by leading scientific dogma. Today’s more
enlightened science is entertaining questions of animal consciousness, cognition, emotion,
and pain. This is significant, because animals’ capacity to suffer has always been at the core

of animal welfare and animal rights ideologies (Bentham, 1789; Singer, 1975). This special
issue on animal suffering and welfare is just the latest in a rapidly growing literature on
animal sentience.
Intriguingly lacking from this discourse has been animals’ capacity for pleasure. With the
exception of a few notable contributions (e.g., Cabanac, 1971; Panksepp, 1998),
discussions of animal sentience have been almost exclusively in the negative realm: pain,
stress, distress. At least nineteen current English language journals (most of them medical)
contain the word ‘‘pain,’’ whereas none deal with ‘‘pleasure.’’ Granted, pain has more moral
urgency than does pleasure (see Pleasure’s Moral Significance, below), the role of pleasure
in human and non-human experience nevertheless deserves far more attention than we
have been giving it.
This paper aims to help correct this imbalance by presenting the argument for animal
pleasure, providing some illustrative examples, and then discussing some of its moral
implications. A more thorough examination of animal pleasure can be found in my book
Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and the Nature of Feeling Good (also available in German
translation as Tierisch Vergnügt) (Balcombe, 2006a). The current paper includes some
newer ideas and perspectives on animal pleasure and its moral implications since
publication of that earlier work.
I should briefly allude to the boundaries of what constitutes an ‘‘animal’’ in the arguments
which follow. It is not the intention of this paper to establish where we might draw the line
as to what species are sentient. It will be apparent from the examples I give below that I
favour a relatively inclusive definition that embraces all vertebrate taxa as well as some
invertebrates, such as cephalopod mollusks. For most, the yardstick (if not necessarily the
pinnacle) of sentience is likely to be an animal’s degree of similarity to humans. What
matters for our purposes is that we can agree to include at least some non-human animals
here. Few would argue, for instance, that a dog or a giraffe is not sentient.
Myopic science
Science has and continues to hold too narrow a perspective in its scholarly interpretation of
animal existence. Specifically, published studies of animal behaviour are presented almost
exclusively in an ultimate, evolutionary context, without discussion of the animals’ more
proximate, mental and emotional experiences. This pattern arises from science’s pursuit of
rigour, which is assumed to be found primarily in the evolutionary context. Schooled on
Occam’s Razor, which holds that the explanation of any phenomenon should make as few
assumptions as possible, scientists adhere to the law of parsimony like a barnacle to a boat
hull. We do not like making assumptions, and we certainly do not wish to be
anthropomorphic (Kennedy, 1992).
For example, when rats show a preference for novel flavours following three days preexposure to a single flavour, we comfortably propose evolutionary theories to account for
the switch. The rats’ behaviour appears adaptive for two reasons: (1) it avoids overdependence on a potentially short-lived food source, and/or (2) it reduces the risk of
developing a micronutrient deficiency (Galef and Whiskin, 2003). These are quite sensible
adaptive explanations for the rats’ behaviour. But we also know with reasonable certainty

that rats do not bone up on Darwinian fitness or ruminate on evolutionary theory. Thus, we
take too narrow a view when we fail to acknowledge the likely experiential basis for the rats’
behaviour: that they simply got tired of eating the same old fare and enjoyed something
new.
Similarly, while there may be good adaptive bases for the broad and diverse human cultural
practice of adding spices to our foods (Billings and Sherman, 1998), I am not aware that
anyone reaches for the oregano or the curry powder with the conscious intent of warding off
intestinal microbes. We spice our food because it enhances the taste.
I propose that Occam’s Razor has been blunted by overuse. As evidence of animals’
cognitive and emotional capacities snowballs (now that we have ended the embargo on
addressing these concepts), it becomes increasingly clear that animals are conscious,
experiencing individuals. And it follows that to deny them such experiences – as science
tacitly does by neglecting to discuss them – we become increasingly outmoded and
anthropocentric, and science loses rigour (Burghardt, 2007). Whenever we address
questions about how an animal might be feeling, we inevitably make assumptions because
we cannot know absolutely what the animal is feeling. And we inescapably
anthropomorphize because we are anthropoid apes. These are not sins so long as we make
reasonable assumptions backed by good science, and so long as we anthropomorphize
critically, from a foundation of knowledge of the animals we were describing (Burghardt,
1991). In the face of current knowledge, it is a bigger assumption that animals are
unconscious, unfeeling things than that they are sentient, emotional and aware.
Furthermore, ascribing conscious experience to animals, and the sentience that ensues,
need not be seen to violate the law of parsimony, for cognitive explanations can be simpler
than cumbersome stimulus–response explanations (de Waal, 1991).
ARGUMENTS FOR A PLEASURABLE KINGDOM
Because an appreciation of animal pleasure and its ethological study –we might call it
Hedonic Ethology – is a nascent and as yet under-represented field, it helps to present
some arguments for its presence and significance. In addition to the issues of parsimony
and anthropomorphism mentioned above, there are still influential scholars who deny
animals a conscious experience of life (e.g., Budiansky, 1998; Macphail, 1998; Wynne,
2004). Thus, the argument still needs making.
Before I proceed with the arguments I find to be most compelling for animals’ experience of
pleasure, let me point out the hypocrisy of any argument for the unprovability of animal
conscious experience that nevertheless accepts its existence in humans. In the purest
sense, human sentience is no more scientifically provable than is non-human sentience.
While our sophisticated language likely permits us to share our pain/pleasure experiences
more discretely on the psychological plane than for other taxa, the physical privacy of
individual experience is as unbridgeable between two humans as it is between a human and
a non-human animal. Quite literally, one person cannot actually feel another’s pain or
pleasure.
Do we thereby accept the non-existence of human sentience? No. We accept it, and with
good reasons even though the solipsist’s claim that ‘‘my mind is the only thing that I know

exists’’ is logically incontrovertible. Thus, to accept the existence of sentience in humans
while denying it in certain animals (say, birds) is scientifically and ethically inconsistent.
Pleasure is adaptive
Pleasure is a product of evolution. The evolution of motility was a key step towards the
eventual evolution of complex sensory systems that could perceive environments and detect
noxious and rewarding stimuli. Just as the capacity for pain is adaptive for a mobile
organism that can move away from aversive things, so too is pleasure beneficial by
rewarding the individual for performing behaviours that promote survival and procreation
(Cabanac, 1971). Because animals can actively avoid and approach things, they benefit
from being able to have a qualitative experience of those things. Pain’s unpleasantness
helps steer the animal away from ‘‘bad’’ behaviours that risk the greater evolutionary
disaster of death (Dawkins, 1998). Similarly, pleasure encourages animals to behave in
‘‘good’’ ways, such as feeding, mating, and – depending on climatic conditions – staying
warm or cool. There are of course energetic costs to evolving and growing complex
neurological organs and sensory systems, but clearly the benefits have outweighed the
costs, at least for members of Phylum Chordata.
Humans feel pleasure
Arguing the case for animal pleasure would be more difficult were it not for the fact that
humans experience pleasure. That we know and accept the existence of this sensory
phenomenon in one species provides a foundation for its presumptive existence in others.
That human languages contain rich vocabularies for describing good feelings attests to the
diversity of both physical and emotional pleasures that can be felt by humans. English
includes: happiness, delight, surprise, anticipation, pride, satisfaction, joy, elation, ecstasy,
thrill, euphoria, exultation, jubilation, excitement, rapture, fulfillment, gratification, and
comfort, among others. Though the writer is unilingual, he is aware of at least one German
word – funktionslust: the pleasure in what one does best – that captures a sort of pleasure
for which English has not a word (Masson and McCarthy, 1995). It seems likely that other
languages contain terms for distinctive pleasures.
Having evolved in diverse environments, where different niches present different adaptive
challenges and opportunities, different animals have different sensory and perceptual skill
sets. It follows that some animals might be able to experience realms of pleasure unfamiliar
to humans. The echolocation abilities of bats and cetaceans, electric communication in
fishes (Hopkins, 1974), and the ability of pinnipeds to detect fish turbulence trails with their
vibrissae (Dehnhardt et al., 2001; Schulte-Pelkum et al., 2007) are representative
examples. Some animals can tune into the earth’s magnetic field to help navigate, and
there is now evidence that birds perceive this visually (Heyers et al., 2007). These examples
do not explicitly involve pleasure, but they illustrate the potential for pleasures unknown to
us. Two leading neuroscientists, and an ethologist, have recently suggested that other
animals may experience some feelings more intensely than we do (Burgdorf and Panksepp,
2007; Bekoff, 2007).

Animals feel pain and distress
A heuristic argument for animals’ experience of pleasure is that they feel pain. Pain in
animals is well studied, and there is solid empirical evidence for its existence in vertebrate
groups (Braithwaite, 2007). The detection of a nociceptive stimulus is highly adaptive for
motile organisms that can move away from the source of the stimulus. We can imagine an
ancient, primitive animal flinching and fleeing from the bite of another. By escaping more
readily than would a non-perceiving conspecific, her genes are more likely to show up in
future generations. For animals with highly developed nervous and sensory systems, being
able to learn from an earlier painful experience is a further refinement of the stimulus–
response dynamic. Cognitive creatures can recognize and remember the source of an earlier
hurt, and make adjustments to their behaviour to reduce the chances of a repeat
experience. The conscious pain perceiver is once again more likely to survive future
encounters and to be favoured by natural selection.
Indirect evidence for animal pain is widespread in nature. Plants, for example, have
exploited animals’ capacity for pain and discomfort with the evolution of thorns, and bitter
tasting chemical compounds in their tissues. Similarly, many animals have well-developed
spines, stingers, horns, and tusks which, like thorns, not only inflict pain, but also signal
‘‘don’t touch.’’
More direct evidence for animal pain resides in animals’ behavioural responses to noxious
stimuli. Their vocalizations and their movements – retreating from and avoiding the source
of pain, flinching, limping, protecting the injured part – are all consistent with what we may
expect of an individual who experiences pain.
Scientific studies of animal pain reinforce what observations suggest. Laboratory studies
have shown repeatedly that injured rats will favour the bitter taste of water that contains a
pain-relieving drug over unadulterated water (Persinger, 2003; Colpaert et al., 1980, 1982).
Chickens also self-administer pain-killers. These birds often experience leg problems
associated with breeding, growth and husbandry, and can develop highly abnormal gaits, or
become completely unable to walk. Lame birds ingest more drugged food than non-lame
birds, and as the severity of the lameness increases, lame birds consume a greater
proportion of the drugged food (Danbury et al., 2000). Fishes can learn to avoid noxious
stimuli such as electric shocks (Ehrensing et al., 1982) and anglers’ hooks (Beukema,
1970a,b), and the evidence for fishes’ experience of pain is mounting (Braithwaite, 2007).
Empirical evidence is now emerging that suggests that some invertebrates experience pain
(Elwood, 2007).
Animals behave as if they feel pleasure
Play
Play behaviour is widespread in mammals, and has also been described in about half of all
avian families (Ortega and Bekoff, 1987). Behaviour suggesting play has been also observed
in other taxa, including reptiles, fishes, and cephalopods (see Burghardt, 2005). Because
play tends to occur spontaneously and unpredictably, it is difficult to measure, and most
published studies of animal play are anecdotal. While the accumulation of well-documented

anecdotes has scientific value, there is also a growing database of empirical studies of play.
For example, a three-year study of aerial drop-catching behaviour by Herring Gulls in
Virginia concluded that it was play. These birds will drop clams onto hard surfaces to smash
them and access the soft parts; they also will swoop to catch clams and other objects they
have dropped before they hit the ground. This latter behaviour appears to be playful (as
opposed to kleptoparasitic, for example) because: dropcatches were performed more by
younger birds, dropcatches were not necessarily made over a hard substrate, the behaviour
was sometimes performed with non-food objects, and it occurred more often during warm,
windy weather (Gamble and Cristol, 2002).
There are good adaptive reasons for the existence of play, and scholarly discussions of play
are usually in the context of its evolutionary benefit (Bekoff and Byers, 1998; Burghardt,
2005). Playing games of chase is no doubt beneficial for healthy, well-fed lambs, as it is for
fox cubs, even though as adults these species may deploy these skills in different contexts
(escape and pursuit, respectively). Yet, animals (including humans) do not consciously play
for ultimate reasons; they play because it is fun to do so. Enhanced survival can be seen as
a positive reward in the evolutionary sense, but not in the sense of experiencing a
pleasurable sensation.
Thus, what is largely lacking in discussions of animal play is its affective element. Inasmuch
as the context and expression of animal play often resemble that of human play, we may
expect that it is pleasurable for them, too. Having fun seems to many of us the main
characteristic of animal play (Burghardt, 2005). Burgdorf and Panksepp (2001) found that
rats would run to the hand, on average, four times as quickly to receive tickles to their
bellies (which mimic rats’ rough-and-tumble play behaviour) than would rats trained to
expect dorsal strokes. Several species are known to calibrate the boisterousness of their
play, apparently to sustain the activity, which also suggests that they are enjoying it. Adult
red-necked wallabies self-handicap against smaller and weaker playmates. For example,
rarely does the larger partner rear up or kick; littler playmates are also much more vigorous
in their play-fighting (Watson and Croft, 1996). Younger chimps are more likely to engage
older chimps who are soliciting play if the latter shows self-handicapping behavior
(Mendoza-Granados and Sommer, 1995). Young chimps (and other species) tested in the
laboratory will choose play over food unless they are very hungry (Goodall and Bekoff,
2002), and there are anecdotal accounts of captive animals working for the chance to play
(Linden, 1999).
We may say that the adaptive benefits of play are what sustains its expression in a gene
pool, but if we are dealing with conscious, emotional animals, we can and should
acknowledge the proximate role of pleasure (another product of evolution) in the
interaction. This more inclusive interpretation is more thorough because pleasure acts as
the proximate mechanism that causes animals (including humans) to behave adaptively—in
this case, by playing.
Food
Because food is so indispensable to an animal’s survival, we may expect that conscious
animals are highly motivated to obtain it, that they anticipate it, and that its consumption

brings rewards. We ‘‘know’’ (though the solipsist could challenge us) that humans have such
a relationship to food. But the experience of food pleasure in animals is almost wholly
unexamined.
There are innumerable clues that animals favour the flavour in their food. They show food
preferences (e.g., Johnston and Fenton, 2001), tastes that change through time (Galef and
Whiskin, 2003), and the anticipation of food (Tinklepaugh, 1928). Some, such as languagetrained apes and parrots, can tell us their reactions to food (Barber, 1993; Linden, 2003). It
has also been shown that animals produce pleasurable compounds known as opioids during
both the search for food (the appetitive phase) and its consumption (the consummatory
phase) (Berridge, 1996).
Facial responses to tastes are similar between rodents, primates and humans, suggesting
shared evolutionary origins (Steiner et al., 2001; Cabanac, 2005). Enjoyably sweet flavours
elicit characteristic licking responses, while aversive bitter tastes elicit gaping and head
shaking. These behavioural responses are accompanied by activity in brain ‘hedonic
hotspots,’ such as the nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum, where neurotransmitters
coordinate the ‘‘liking’’ of tastes (Pecin˜a et al., 2006; Norgren et al., 2006). This linking of
brain activity with positive patterns of behaviour (Berridge, 1996) suggests the conscious
experience of pleasure.
A study of juvenile green iguanas showed that these animals would trade off the palatability
of a bait (lettuce) with the disadvantage of having to venture into a very cold area to
retrieve it. As the ambient temperature at the bait decreased, the lizards visited the bait
less frequently and for shorter periods, choosing instead to stay under the heatlamp where
nutritionally complete reptile chow was freely available. Moreover, time interval between
sessions with bait (rangingfrom1to8days) had no effect on the duration of stay on the bait,
suggesting that the lettuce was more of a luxury rather than an indispensable nutritional
food source (Balaskó and Cabanac, 1998). Earlier experiments found that rats invariably
shunned laboratory chowand ran into a cold environment to consume highly palatable
foods, and that the animals’ individual preferences (which varied considerably) were
reflected by the amount eaten, the number of excursions, and the time spent feeding in the
cold (Cabanac and Johnson, 1983).
A compelling and ecologically important example of the hedonic aspects of food to animals
is the evolution of fruit as a seed-dispersal mechanism. Fruit, to paraphrase botanist and
science writer Michael Pollan, evolved as the product of a grand co-evolutionary bargain
struck between plants and animals (Pollan, 2001). Desire, according to Pollan, is built into
the very nature and purpose of fruit. He is correct, but you would have to search hard to
find any scientists saying as much in a peer-reviewed journal. When I was researching this
paper, I encountered a brief essay titled ‘‘Seed dispersal by animals: Behaviour matters,’’
by a then-doctoral student of botany at Washington State University. While lucid on the
evolutionary facets of plant-animal coevolution, the writer nevertheless makes this
characteristically agnostic statement:
‘‘Fruit appearance provides the cue for fruit choice, but nutrients provide the positive
feedback that maintains an animal’s preference for the fruit.’’(Yang, nd)

Surely, if our own experience is any guide, what provides the animal with (immediate)
positive feedback is not nutrients, but the taste of the fruit. Nutrients are the mediator;
taste is the sentience pay-off. The more proximal experience of taste is an evolutionary
product of what is nutritionally beneficial to the forager. And its flavour, not nutrient content
directly, is what an animal experiences consciously when she selects and eats a fruit.
Sex
It is hard to overestimate the importance of reproduction to an organism. Without it,
species would cease to exist. Because reproduction is so important, natural selection should
strongly favour behaviours that promote mate-seeking, mating and, where necessary, the
raising of young. In conscious, feeling creatures, we may expect that what motivates them
to behave in these ways is a combination of instinct on the one hand, and a powerful desire
to attain reward on the other.
When it comes to sex, science is once again fixated on the ultimate, evolutionary context to
explain how animals behave, and not the proximate, experiential context. Sexual activity in
animals is conventionally portrayed as all business and no pleasure. The Encyclopedia of
Animal Behaviour, for example (Bekoff, 2004), contains several entries about animal sexual
behaviour, all of which interpret that behaviour solely in evolutionary contexts. From journal
articles to textbooks to television documentaries, the idea that animals may be enjoying
themselves is not explicitly rejected; it is not mentioned at all. The result is that there is
precious little consideration of how animals might be feeling during sexual encounters, and
how this, in turn, might affect their behaviour.
What, then, might be said of the role of pleasure in animals’ sex lives? We do know that
pleasure is a powerful reinforcer of sex drive in humans. Furthermore, the human quest for
sexual gratification (and profit) manifests itself in an astonishing diversity (and, one might
add, perversity) of sexual behaviour—witness a thriving pornography industry that caters to
a wide range of individual sexual leanings and fetishes.
Against this human backdrop, sexual behaviour in nonhuman animals may appear both
perfunctory and passionless, when it is observed at all. Yet, a good deal of animal sexual
behaviour appears not devoted directly to the reproductive fitness (Bagemihl, 1999). In
Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity, Bagemihl surveyed of
homosexuality and other forms of non-procreative sexual behaviour among mammals and
birds. He found a lot of it.
And there is a lot of it. Many animals routinely copulate or engage in other sexual activities
outside of the breeding season, including during pregnancy, menstruation (in mammals),
and egg incubation. Such non-procreative activity may even constitute a large proportion of
the animals’ sexual behaviour, as it does, for instance, for common murres, proboscis
monkeys, addax antelopes, rhesus macaques, wildebeest, golden lion tamarins, and
mountain goats (see Bagemihl, 1999 for citations). Another variation on the theme of
wasteful sex is group sexual activity wherein few if any participants are passing along
genes. These sorts of orgies have been observed in spinner dolphins, gray and bowhead
whales, swallows, and herons (ibid). Variations on non-copulatory mounting, include:
mounts without erection, mounts with erection (but with no penetration), reverse mounting

in which a female mounts a male, mounting from the side or in positions from which
penetration is impossible, which has been reported in mammals such as Japanese
macaques, waterbuck, mountain sheep, takhi (Przewalski’s horse), collared peccaries,
warthogs and koalas, and birds including ruffs, hamerkops and chaffinches. Animals also
engage in various forms of oral sex, stimulation of partner’s genitals using the hands, paws,
or flippers, and various forms of anal stimulation. There are also observations of
interspecies sexual coupling in the wild (Bagemihl, 1999).
Skeptics might claim that these misguided antics are the fumblings of young, confused or
otherwise inexperienced individuals, though cases of oral or manual stimulation and crossspecies interactions strain such claims. Behaviours that probably most suggest that sexual
stimulation is pleasurable are various forms of auto-erotic behaviour. Owing to its utter
futility for procreation, masturbation suggests that the performer merely seeks pleasure.
Masturbation is widespread in mammals, and practiced about equally by both females and
males (Bagemihl, 1999; Judson, 2003). It is known from at least seven mammalian orders,
including primates, carnivores, bats, walruses, ungulates, cetaceans, and rodents.
Masturbation appears less common in birds, but is not absent (e.g., Burger, 2001; Gaston
and Kampp, 1994; Winterbottom et al., 2001).
Most biologists today recognize same-sex sexual interactions as being part of the normal,
routine behavioural repertoire of the animals who engage in it. Currently, at least 300
species of vertebrates are known to practice homosexuality (Bagemihl, 1999). In most
cases, participating individuals will also engage in heterosexual behaviour, and their sexual
life history can most accurately be categorized as bisexual. Homosexual behaviour is clearly
maladaptive from a strictly procreational standpoint, and while practitioners may benefit by
gaining practice, or by releasing sexual tension, pleasurable rewards seem a likely
motivation for engaging in it.
There are other bases for sexual pleasure in animals, including the prevalence of a clitoris in
female mammals, and evidence for female orgasm in various primate groups, including
apes, monkeys, lemurs and marmosets (Dixson, 1998; Bagemihl, 1999). In one study of
Japanese macaques, female orgasmic responses were observed in 80 of 240 copulations
(33%) (Troisi and Carosi, 1998).
Touch
Unlike food or sex, touch is neither indispensable to survival nor to reproductive success.
However, touch sensitivity is very useful. It allows animals to react adaptively to their
environments. For example, being able to detect water movements helps fishes orient
themselves in murky streams and on migration routes, and to detect the movements of
other nearby animals, including potential predators. But for social species especially, touch
often plays a key role in interactions with other individuals. Chimpanzees and other
primates are well known for their proclivity to groom one another, which some species
spend on average about 20% of their waking time doing (Uhlenbroek, 2002). Given its
importance in these social contexts, we may expect that touch is a source of pleasure, as
we know it to be from our own experience.

Very few investigators have addressed the pleasure of touch. In some cases, animals’ liking
of tactile contact may reveal itself by accident. For example, in a study in which dolphins
could request rewards (pleasures) by pressing plastic symbols on a keyboard with the tips
of their beaks, some animals favoured getting a rub to getting a fish (Linden, 2003). In
some locations, whale-watchers have gained the trust of gray whales, who ride up against
the sides of boats to have their bodies stroked and patted (Nollman, 1986). These examples
do not prove that cetaceans enjoy the feeling of touch, but they are consistent with it.
There have been a few attempts to measure positive physiological responses in groomed
animals. In primates, the release of pain-relieving endorphins has been demonstrated when
they groom each other (Keverne, 1992). Evidence from horses supports a pleasant, calming
effect. Like many other mammal species that form social groups, Camargue horses regularly
engage in mutual grooming. When human researchers experimentally groomed them, the
animals’ heart rates dropped significantly, but only when the touch was directed at those
areas of the neck that are the preferred grooming sites in this species (Feh and de Mazières,
1993).
As part of the study of tickling in rats mentioned earlier, tickled rats were trained for nine
days to press a bar to receive tickling. A second, inactive bar elicited no tickling when
pressed. On the test days that followed, the rats pressed the active bar repeatedly to
receive tickling; they almost never pressed the inactive bar, and their bar-pressing
increased during this period. For seven days of extinction testing, during which time barpressing elicited no tickling, use of the active bar declined significantly and by the fifth day
was equivalent to presses on the inactive bar (Burgdorf and Panksepp, 2001).
Some interesting evidence for positive affect associated with touch has been documented in
interspecies interactions in aquatic environments. At a freshwater spring in Kenya, fishes of
various species gravitate to wallowing hippopotamuses, nibbling and plucking at their skin.
Observations by biologists/photographers Mark Deeble and Victoria Stone indicate that the
hippos are far from passive participants in these cleaning services. They deliberately splay
their toes, spread their legs and hold their mouths open to provide easy access for the
fishes, and they appear to solicit cleanings by visiting ‘cleaning stations’ where fish
congregate (Deeble and Stone, 2001). The hippos were so relaxed during these ‘‘spa
treatments’’ that they would sometimes fall asleep.
The widespread phenomenon of fish cleaning stations not only gives us a fascinating
glimpse into the experiences of animals still assumed by many to have no feelings (Rose,
2007), they offer compelling evidence for the experience of tactile pleasure in fish. Cleaner
fish of a variety of species nibble loose skin, fungal growths, and fish lice from other fish
‘‘clients.’’ Wounds may also be plucked at, which may relieve infection and speed healing. It
is a mutualism: cleaners benefit by getting food – delivered buffet-style by clients who lineup patiently to await their turn – and clients get a body-cleansing service. Different species
of customers (or ‘‘hosts’’) are cleaned in a highly specific manner by cleaner fish (and
shrimps), who advertise their services with brightly colored uniforms, and perform
bobbing/fussing movements to signal their willingness to attend to clients. Clients also may
signal their readiness, for instance by orienting themselves vertically in the water, and

opening their mouths and gills at appropriate times to allow access to the cleaner fishes
(Potts, 1973).
There are features of the cleaner–client relationship that suggest positive feelings are
involved. Invitation postures indicate that cleaners may be anticipating the attentions of
clients, and clients the services of their hosts (Potts, 1973). Recent study of one of the
principal cleaner species, the cleaner wrasse, supports the notion that tactile stimulation is
an important motivator for the interaction. Based on 112 h of observation of 12 different
cleaners, cleaners appear able to alter client decisions over how long to stay for an
inspection, and to stop clients from fleeing or responding aggressively to a cleaner bite that
made them jolt (Bshary and Wuerth, 2001). There is also evidence that cleaners and clients
recognize each other (Tebbich et al., 2002), and that they return to their favoured business
partner (Bshary and Shaeffer, 2002), much as we return to a favourite barber or
hairdresser. Finally, cleaners sometime cheat by nipping off some of the client’s own skin;
established clients behave as if taking serious offense at this, chasing the cleaner around,
and/or shunning the cleaner’s future solicitations (Bshary and Grutter, 2005). This
punishment helps to stabilize the relationship between cleaners and their clients.
Other pleasures
Animals’ lives afford them the opportunity to experience a wealth of other pleasures beyond
the realms of food, sex and touch. Animals seek comfort, pursuing rewarding sensations
that help maintain homeostasis (Cabanac, 1971), such as basking in the sun or seeking
shade. Animals may also appreciate esthetic beauty; for example, female preference for
showy male displays has driven sexual selection for elaborate beauty. And animals may
experience a broad spectrum of emotions (Masson and McCarthy, 1995; Bekoff, 2007).
Demonstrating these phenomena is challenging in species which cannot report their
experiences in the way that humans can. As interest in the sensory experiences of animals
rises, we may expect more ingenious methods to probe them, and more data to shed light
on these topics.
PLEASURE’S MORAL SIGNIFICANCE
What, if any, are the moral implications of animal pleasure? Does being not merely a painavoider but also a pleasure-seeker add to whatever moral implications may follow from the
capacity for pain and distress? Beginning with 18th Century philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s
(1796) now famous appeal to animals’ capacity to suffer (‘‘The question is not: Can they
talk, or Can they reason, but Can they suffer’’), most of the recent scientific and
philosophical discourse about animal welfare and rights has focused around pain and
suffering. This is intriguing, for the consideration of pleasure has made some major
contributions to moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, first expounded as a formal philosophy by
Bentham, favours actions that optimize pleasurable outcomes while minimizing negative
ones. Notably, Bentham regarded animals as serious objects of moral concern, based on
their capacity for both pain and pleasure. That Bentham’s utilitarianism has also been called
Hedonistic Utilitarianism is a further acknowledgment of the importance of pleasures
toconsiderations of right and wrong.

Peter Singer, the most influential contemporary utilitarian philosopher, has argued
persuasively that sentient animals have interests, and that those interests involve not just
avoiding physical pain and/or psychological suffering but also the experience of pleasure
(Singer, 1975). But Singer himself admits to a general preoccupation with negative
experiences: ‘‘. . .my focus has always been on animals’ capacity to suffer, from the time I
started thinking seriously about the ethics of how we treat them’’ (Singer, 2007).
Some imbalance here is to be expected, given the greater urgency and gravity attached to
pain and suffering when compared to pleasure. The avoidance of pain relates to matters of
immediate survival; pain evolved as a means to avoid the greater penalty of death. Pain
teaches individuals to avoid dangerous or harmful behaviours and encourages prudence in
the decisions they make, for instance, in the pursuit of survival and social interactions.
Pleasure, by comparison, does not normally hinge on the grave matter of survival, at least
not in the immediate sense; obviously, if an animal were to ignore the motivations provided
by the anticipation of food and the pleasure of its consumption, then that animal would soon
die.
But the utter absence of any scholarly journal dedicated to positive feelings is surprising
given pleasure’s important – arguably central – role in sentient experience. Readers might
ask themselves what drew them to their career choice, and what motivates their
preferences on a restaurant menu, their choice of clothing, or their weekend pastimes.
The capacity for good feelings has important corollaries for ethics. Lives that contain
pleasure are lives with intrinsic value (Regan, 1983). That is to say, an individual who can
experience good feelings has a life that is of value to that individual, independent of any
value that individual’s life might have to another, for example as a source of entertainment,
or revenue (ibid). Put another way, an animal who can experience pleasure has the capacity
for a quality of life (McMillan, 2005). It is a life worth living, one in which there are better
and worse days, and moments that are more or less pleasurable than others.
Humankind’s relationship to animals has been and continues to be one based mostly on a
‘‘might-makes-right’’ or ‘‘bright-makes-right’’ ethic. With our large brains and manipulative
hands, our sophisticated language and technologies, we have evolved the capacity to
control other animals completely. And we wield that control to the fullest. According to the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), over 50 billion land animals
worldwide were killed for food in 2005 (Steinfeld et al., 2006). The numbers of individual
fishes killed by humans are probably higher based on FAO statistics; global consumption in
2004 was 141.6 million metric tons (FAO, 2007). Close to 100 million animals are consumed
yearly in laboratory experimentation in the United States (Carbone, 2004). The Humane
Society of the United States estimates that each year over 50 million animals are killed for
their fur (HSUS, 2007). Paradoxically, the number of animals we kill continues to rise,
despite our greater appreciation for and ethical concern towards animals than ever before.
While there have been some scientific advances towards better understanding the animal’s
experience of slaughter (Grandin, 1994; Gregory, 2004), modern methods of killing still
involve intense levels of stress, pain and suffering (Warrick, 2001; Patterson, 2002; Scully,
2004). We may naturally conclude that harm is done to them. To the degree the victims can

also feel pleasure, it may not follow obviously that the harm of a painful, stressful end is
amplified. Surely, it is suffering, not pleasure, that weighs on death.
Pleasure’s moral significance resides in two aspects of our relationship to other animals.
Each relates to the denial of pleasures. First, when we keep animals in impoverished
conditions, as we do in factory farms, laboratory cages (Mason, 1991), and zoos (Jensen
and Tweedy-Holmes, 2007), we deny them the opportunity to express natural behaviours.
At least in rats and mice, studies show that animals bred for many generations in captive
confinement retain behaviours of their wild ancestors (Estep et al., 1975; Boice, 1977), and
that they are highly motivated to engage in behaviours that are a routine part of their dayto-day lives in nature, such as foraging, exploring, and social behaviour (Dawkins, 1988;
Balcombe, 2006b).
One objection to this denial-of-pleasure argument is that captivity may offer the animal safe
shelter from the vicissitudes of life in the wild (Tannenbaum, 2001). Wild existence can be
hazardous, and some species may live longer in captivity (though others, such as
cetaceans, do not). The problem with this objection is that a safer life is by no means a
better life. We would be safer if we stayed home and never ate food prepared by others, for
instance, but few of us would choose this mundane sort of existence. Another problem is
that animals – like humans – prefer not to be confined; it is fairly axiomatic that animals
prefer freedom to being in a cage.
The second form of denial of pleasure relates to death. In killing animals – especially young,
healthy animals – we cause harm by denying them the opportunity to experience rewards
that life would otherwise offer them. It may be claimed that a dead animal misses nothing.
But the main reason that our criminal system treats murder so seriously is not that the
victim may suffer—though that certainly compounds the crime. Murder is wrong because
life, specifically that portion of life yet to be experienced, has value. Thus, killing is the
greatest harm that can be done to conscious, autonomous beings (Balluch, 2006), and
pleasure is firmly rooted in the harm committed.
CONCLUSION
With the removal of former behaviourist taboos against subjective experiences in animals
and the subsequent rise of cognitive ethology, there is an accelerating accumulation of
information supporting animal sentience and awareness. Mice show empathy (Langford et
al., 2006), sheep respond to the emotional states of other sheep (Da Costa et al., 2004),
monkeys show a sense of justice (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), starlings can become
optimistic or pessimistic (Bateson and Matheson, 2007; Matheson et al., 2007), and rats
show mirthful responses to tickling (Burgdorf and Panksepp, 2001). Science shows us that
humans are not the only autonomous, sentient beings, or the only hedonists. Many other
animals also have livesworth living. They do not speak as we do, but the scientific case that
they have experiences is far stronger than the case that they do not.
The inevitable moral question arises: How can we reconcile our current treatment of animals
with this knowledge? The answer, I believe, is that we decisively cannot. The reason for this
lies in the principles that inform human law and policy. As autonomous, sentient beings,
humans have intrinsic value. It follows that we have certain basic, inviolable rights

(provided we behave within the confines of the law), such as the right to freedom and the
right to life. What grants us these rights is our intrinsic worth. Our reasoning and linguistic
abilities are not the foundation of such rights, else we would deny them to the many
humans who lack these capacities (Singer, 1975).
Despite this, our treatment of animals continues to languish in a Cartesian framework, one
that permits the sacrificing of animals’ most precious possessions (their freedom and their
lives) for such relatively trivial human ends as gustatory pleasure, and recreation (Regan,
1983). Each hen in a battery house of 30,000 individuals has the capacity and potential to
perform a range of highly motivated, rewarding behaviours, such as scratching, dustbathing
and uttering and responding to a broad repertoire of social calls (Hughes and Channing,
1998; Widowski and Duncan, 2000; Evans and Evans, 1999). That she is unable to do so
constitutes a denial of pleasures by human interference. Her suffering is compounded by the
frustration of rewards. If we view animals’ interests solely in terms of avoiding pain and
suffering, then the case for their moral protection appears sound. When we include their
capacity for pleasure, the case is made stronger.
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